The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.
Introduction
The Nakamura number plays a critical role in the study of preference aggregation rules with acyclic social preferences. 1 Consider a (simple) game 2 -a coalitional game that assigns either 0 or 1 to each coalition: those assigned 1 are winning coalitions and those assigned 0 are losing coalitions. Combining the game with a set of alternatives and a profile of individual preferences, one obtains a simple game with (ordinal) preferences, from which one can derive a social preference (dominance relation). Nakamura's theorem (1979) gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a simple game with preferences to have a nonempty core (the set of maximal elements of the social preference) for all profiles: the number of alternatives is less than a certain number (the smallest number of winning coalitions that collectively form an empty intersection), called the Nakamura number of the simple game. Thus the greater the Nakamura number for a given game is, the larger the set of alternatives is from which the rule (mapping from profiles to social preferences) can always find a maximal element. Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Theorem 17 ) extend Nakamura's theorem to their framework and apply it to computable simple games. They show that every (nonweak) computable game has a finite Nakamura number. This implies that under the preference aggregation rule based on a computable game, the number of alternatives that the set of players can deal with rationally is restricted by this number. (Remark 1 gives a formal discussion of this result.)
We are therefore interested in the question of how large the Nakamura number can be. In fact, Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Proposition 15) show that every integer k ≥ 2 is the Nakamura number of some computable game. Of course, a large Nakamura number can be attained only by satisfying or violating certain properties for simple games. For example, the Nakamura number of a nonproper game, which admits two complementing winning coalitions, is at most 2 (Lemma 6).
In this paper, we study the restrictions that various properties (axioms) for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We restrict our attention to the computable simple games and classify them into thirty-two (2 5 ) classes in terms of their types (with respect to monotonicity, properness, 3 Possible Nakamura numbers are given in each entry, assuming that an empty coalition is losing (so that the Nakamura number is at least 2). The types are defined by the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. For example, the entries corresponding to Type 2 (+ + +−) indicates that among the computable, monotonic (+), proper (+), strong (+), weak (−, because not nonweak) games, finite ones have a Nakamura number equal to +∞ and infinite ones do not exist.
strongness, and nonweakness) and finiteness (existence of a finite carrier). Table 1 summarizes the results. For example, a type 5 (+−++) (monotonic, nonproper, strong, nonweak) computable game has Nakamura number equal to 2, whether it is finite or infinite. 4 Note that the Nakamura number for a weak game is infinite by definition. We make two observations from Table 1 . First, a nonweak computable game has a Nakamura number greater than 3 only if it is proper, and nonstrong (i.e., either of type 3 (+ + −+) or of type 11 (− + −+)). 5 In particular, such games from a strategic game form, giving a justification (strategic foundation) for including them. For example, we obtain a nonproper game from the game form g, defined by g(0, 0) = g(0, 1) = g(1, 0) = 0 and g(1, 1) = 1, which describes the unanimous voting rule. Each player is effective for the set {0} in the sense that by choosing 0, she can force the outcome to be in the set. Then the simple game consisting of the coalitions that are effective for {0} is nonproper. For another example, we obtain in Remark 4 an important class of nonmonotonic games from a certain class of game forms.
4 Strictly speaking, we only assert in this paper that the numbers in each entry in the table are not ruled out; we are not much interested in asserting that every entry not indicated "none" contains a game in which an empty coalition is losing. However, those who accept the results in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) will find the latter assertion acceptable. For most entries, the examples given in the paper cited suffice. For the other entries, we need to modify the examples-which we do, with the exception of a few entries (footnote 13).
5 Propositions 11 and 19 state that any Nakamura number k ≥ 3 is attainable by type 3 finite and infinite games. Propositions 12 and 20 state that any Nakamura number k ≥ 2 is attainable by type 11 finite and infinite games. Remark 4 gives a strategic foundations for these games.
for the players to be always able to choose a maximal element from at least three alternatives, strongness of the game must be forgone (unless the game is dictatorial (type 2)). The reader should not overlook the importance of the number 3 in the above observation. It is the Nakamura number of the majority game with an odd number of (at least three) players. To deal with three or more alternatives rationally (though it is generally impossible to rank them (Arrow, 1963) ) requires a Nakamura number greater than 3. Second, as far as computable games are concerned, a number k is the Nakamura number of a finite game of a certain type (except type 2) if and only if it is that of an infinite game of the same type. Restricting games to finite ones does not reduce or increase the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally.
In contrast, if we drop the computability condition, these observations are no longer true. A "nonprincipal ultrafilter," which is noncomputable and has an infinite Nakamura number (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008) , serves as a counterexample to both: It is a nonweak game with a Nakamura number greater than 3, but it is strong. It is a type 1 infinite game with a Nakamura number different from 3, the Nakamura number of type 1 finite games. In fact, one can use ultrafilters not only to find a maximal element from any finite set of alternatives (regardless of the size), but also to rank (while preserving the transitivity of the weak social preference) any number of alternatives (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Section 5) . This fact explains why nonprincipal ultrafilters are used for resolving Arrow's impossibility (1963) . The lack of computability of nonprincipal ultrafilters, however, implies that such resolutions are impractical (Mihara, 1997) .
The rest of the Introduction gives a background briefly. Much of it is fully discussed in Kumabe and Mihara (2008) .
One can think of simple games as representing voting methods or multicriterion decision rules. They have been central to the study of social choice (e.g., Peleg, 2002) . For this reason, the paper can be viewed as a contribution to the foundations of computability analysis of social choice, which studies algorithmic properties of social decision-making. 6 The importance of computability in social choice theory would be unarguable. First, the use of the language by social choice theorists suggests the importance: for example, Arrow (1963) uses words such as "process or rule" or "procedure." Second, there is a normative reason: computability of social choice rules formalizes the notion of "due process." 7 We consider an infinite set of "players." Roughly speaking, a simple game is computable if there is a Turing program (finite algorithm) that can decide from a description (by integer) of each coalition whether it is winning or losing. Since each member of a coalition should be describable, we assume that the set N of (the names of) players is countable, say, N = N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Also, we describe coalitions by a Turing program that can decide for the name of each player whether she is in the coalition. Since each Turing program has its code number (Gödel number), the coalitions describable in this manner are describable by an integer, as desired. (Such coalitions are called recursive coalitions.) Kumabe and Mihara (2008) give three interpretations of countably many players: (i) generations of people extending into the indefinite future, (ii) finitely many persons facing countably many states of the world (Mihara, 1997) , and (iii) attributes or criteria in multi-criterion decision-making. 8 We can naturally re-interpret the preference aggregation problem (which provides motivation for studying the Nakamura number) as a multi-criterion ranking problem, for example. In multi-criterion ranking, each criterion ranks finitely many alternatives; we are interested in aggregating those countably many rankings into one (acyclic relation). Assuming that the underlying simple game is computable is intuitively plausible in view of the following consequences: (i) each criterion is treated differently; 9 (ii) whether an alternative has a higher rank than another can be determined by examine finitely many criteria, though how many criteria need to be examined depends on each situation (Proposition 4). The (lack of strongness) observation mentioned above suggests that rational choice from many (at least three) alternatives often involves alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.
Framework

Simple games
Let N = N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be a countable set of (the names of) players. Any recursive (algorithmically decidable) subset of N is called a (recursive) coalition.
Intuitively, a simple game describes in a crude manner the power distribution among observable (or describable) coalitions (subsets of players). We assume that only recursive coalitions are observable. According to Church's thesis (Soare, 1987; Odifreddi, 1992) , the recursive coalitions are the sets of players for which there is an algorithm that can decide for the name of each player whether she is in the set. 10 Note that the class REC 8 Legal decisions involve (iii). Kumabe and Mihara (2007) discuss the formation of legal precedents, in which an infinite number of criteria are potentially relevant but only finitely many of them are actually cited.
9 Computable simple games violate anonymity (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Proposition 13) .
10 Soare (1987) and Odifreddi (1992) give a more precise definition of recursive sets as of recursive coalitions forms a Boolean algebra; that is, it includes N and is closed under union, intersection, and complementation. Formally, a (simple) game is a collection ω ⊆ REC of (recursive) coalitions. We will be explicit when we require that N ∈ ω. The coalitions in ω are said to be winning. The coalitions not in ω are said to be losing. One can regard a simple game as a function from REC to {0, 1}, assigning the value 1 or 0 to each coalition, depending on whether it is winning or losing.
We introduce from the theory of cooperative games a few basic notions of simple games (Peleg, 2002; Weber, 1994) . A simple game ω is said to be monotonic if for all coalitions S and T , the conditions S ∈ ω and T ⊇ S imply T ∈ ω. ω is proper if for all recursive coalitions S, S ∈ ω implies S c := N \ S / ∈ ω. ω is strong if for all coalitions S, S / ∈ ω implies S c ∈ ω. ω is weak if ω = ∅ or the intersection ω = S∈ω S of the winning coalitions is nonempty. The members of ω are called veto players; they are the players that belong to all winning coalitions. (The set ω of veto players may or may not be observable.) ω is dictatorial if there exists some i 0 (called a dictator) in N such that ω = { S ∈ REC : i 0 ∈ S }. Note that a dictator is a veto player, but a veto player is not necessarily a dictator. It is immediate to prove the following well-known lemmas:
Lemma 1 If a simple game is weak, it is proper.
Lemma 2 A simple game is dictatorial if and only if it is strong and weak.
A carrier of a simple game ω is a coalition S ⊂ N such that T ∈ ω ⇐⇒ S ∩ T ∈ ω for all coalitions T . When a game ω has a carrier T , we often restrict the game on T and identify ω with ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω}. We observe that if S is a carrier, then so is any coalition S ′ ⊇ S. Slightly abusing the word, we sometimes say a game is finite if it has a finite carrier; otherwise, the game is infinite.
The Nakamura number ν(ω) of a game ω is the size of the smallest collection of winning coalitions having empty intersection
, ω is nonweak); otherwise, set ν(ω) = +∞, which is understood to be greater than any cardinal number. In computing the Nakamura number for a game, it suffices to look only at the subfamily of minimal winning coalitions, provided that the game is finite. If the game is infinite, we cannot say so since minimal winning coalitions may not exist.
well as detailed discussion of recursion theory. The papers by Mihara (1997 Mihara ( , 1999 ) contain short reviews of recursion theory.
Extending and applying the well-known result by Nakamura (1979) , Kumabe and Mihara (2008) show that computability of a game entails a restriction on the number of alternatives that the set of players (with the coalition structure described by the game) can deal with rationally. The following remark gives a formal presentation of that result, adapted to the present framework.
Remark 1 Let X be a (finite or infinite) set of alternatives, with cardinal number #X ≥ 2. Let A be the set of (strict) preferences, i.e., acyclic (for any finite set {x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,
A simple game with (ordinal) preferences is a list (ω, X, p) of a simple game ω in which an empty coalition is losing, a set X of alternatives, and a profile p. Given a simple game with preferences, we define the dominance relation (social preference) ≻ p ω by x ≻ p ω y if and only if there is a winning coalition S ∈ ω such that x ≻ p i y for all i ∈ S. Note that the mapping ≻ ω from profiles p to dominance relations ≻ p ω defines an aggregation rule. The core C(ω, X, p) of the simple game with preferences is the set of undominated alternatives:
C(ω, X, p) = {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ X such that y ≻ p ω x}. Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Corollary 19) show that if ω is computable and nonweak, then there exists a finite number ν (the Nakamura number ν(ω)) such that the core C(ω, X, p) is nonempty for all profiles p if and only if #X < ν.
The computability notion
To define the notion of computability for simple games, we first introduce an indicator for them. In order to do that, we first represent each recursive coalition by a characteristic index (∆ 0 -index). Here, a number e is a characteristic index for a coalition S if ϕ e (the partial function computed by the Turing program with code number e) is the characteristic function for S. Intuitively, a characteristic index for a coalition describes the coalition by a Turing program that can decide its membership. The indicator then assigns the value 0 or 1 to each number representing a coalition, depending on whether the coalition is winning or losing. When a number does not represent a recursive coalition, the value is undefined.
Given a simple game ω, its δ-indicator is the partial function δ ω on N defined by
1 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set in ω, 0 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set not in ω, ↑ if e is not a characteristic index for any recursive set.
Note that δ ω is well-defined since each e ∈ N can be a characteristic index for at most one set.
We now introduce the notion of (δ)-computable games. We start by giving an intuition. A number (characteristic index) representing a coalition (equivalently, a Turing program that can decide the membership of the coalition) is presented by an inquirer to the aggregator (planner), who will compute whether the coalition is winning or not. The aggregator cannot know a priori which indices will possibly be presented to her. So, the aggregator should be ready to give an answer whenever a characteristic index for some recursive set is presented to her. This intuition justifies the following condition of computability. 11 (δ)-computability δ ω has an extension to a partial recursive function.
Preliminary Results
In this section, we give a sufficient condition and a necessary condition for a game to be computable.
Notation. We identify a natural number k with the finite set {0, 1, 2, . . . , k− 1}, which is an initial segment of N. Given a coalition S ⊆ N , we write S ∩ k to represent the coalition {i ∈ S : i < k} consisting of the members of S whose name is less than k. We call S ∩ k the k-initial segment of S, and view it either as a subset of N or as the string S[k] of length k of 0's and 1's (representing the restriction of its characteristic function to {0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}).
Definition 1 Consider a simple game. A string τ (of 0's and 1's) of length k ≥ 0 is winning determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ (in the sense that τ is an initial segment of G, i.e., G∩k = τ ) is winning; τ is losing determining if any coalition G ∈ REC extending τ is losing. A string is determining if it is either winning determining or losing determining. A string is nondetermining if it is not determining.
The following proposition restates a sufficient condition (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008 , the "if" direction of Theorem 4) for a game to be computable. In particular, finite games are computable. The proposition can be proved easily:
Proposition 3 (Kumabe and Mihara (2007) ) Let T 0 and T 1 be recursively enumerable sets of (nonempty) strings such that any coalition has an initial segment in T 0 or in T 1 but not both. Let ω be the simple game defined by S ∈ ω if and only if S has an initial segment in T 1 . Then T 1 consists only of winning determining strings, T 0 consists only of losing determining strings, and ω is δ-computable.
The following proposition (Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Proposition 3) gives a necessary condition for a game to be computable:
Proposition 4 (Kumabe and Mihara (2008)) Suppose that a δ-computable simple game is given. (i) If a coalition S is winning, then it has an initial segment S[k] (for some k ∈ N) that is winning determining. (ii) If S is losing, then it has an initial segment S[k] that is losing determining.
The Main Results
We classify computable games into thirty-two (2 5 ) classes as shown in Table 1, in terms of their (conventional) types (with respect to the conventional axioms of monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness) and finiteness (existence of a finite carrier). Among the sixteen types, five (types 6, 8, 10, 14, and 16) contain no games; also, the class of type 2 infinite games is empty (since type 2 games are dictatorial). 12 We therefore have only (16−5)×2−1 = 21 classes of games to be checked. For each such class, we find the set of possible Nakamura numbers. We do so, whenever important, by constructing a game in the class having a particular Nakamura number, unless the example given in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) suffices. 13 We only consider games in which ∅ is losing. Otherwise, the Nakamura number for the game becomes 1-not a very interesting case. (Also, note that if ∅ is winning and the game has a losing coalition, then it is nonmonotonic.)
We consider weak games first. Among the weak games, types 2, 4, and 12 are nonempty. 14 By definition, their Nakamura number is infinite. We have so far examined all the types whose labels are even numbers.
12 These results, also found in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) , are immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2.
13 Some examples in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) violate the condition that ∅ is losing, which we impose in this paper. In this paper, we omit examples of games with a small Nakamura number when the construction is based on the details of the paper cited. Specifically, we relegate examples of a type 9 infinite game and a type 13 infinite game to Appendix B.
14 These types, being weak, consist of games in which ∅ is losing. Kumabe and Mihara (2007) give examples of these types of games.
We henceforth consider nonweak (hence nonempty by definition) computable games. Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Corollary 16) show that they have finite Nakamura numbers:
Lemma 5 (Kumabe and Mihara (2008)) Let ω be a computable, nonweak simple game. Then, its Nakamura number ν(ω) is finite.
Small Nakamura numbers
First, the definition of proper games implies the following: 15
Lemma 6 Let ω be a game satisfying ∅ / ∈ ω (and ω = ∅). If ω is nonproper, then ω is nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Lemma 6 is equivalent to the assertion that a game is proper if its Nakamura number ν(ω) is at least 3. It does not rule out the possibility that proper games have Nakamura number equal to 2. Lemma 6 implies that the games of types 5, 7, 13, and 15 have Nakamura number equal to 2. Example 1 gives examples of type 13 and type 15 finite games. 16 Example 1 We first give a type 13 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier and let ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} consist of {0, 1, 2}, {1, 2}, {0}, {1}, {2}. The other three coalitions in T are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic, nonproper, strong, and nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
We next give a type 15 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier and let ω|T consist of {0, 1, 2}, {1, 2}, {0}, {1}. The other four coalitions in T are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic, nonproper, nonstrong, and nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Next, we consider computable strong games that are nonweak. These games have Nakamura numbers not greater than 3:
Lemma 7 Let ω be a computable, strong nonweak game satisfying ∅ / ∈ ω. Then ν(ω) = 2 or 3.
Proof. Since ω is computable, by Proposition 4, every winning coalition has a finite subcoalition that is winning, which in turn has a minimal winning subcoalition that is winning. If there is only one minimal winning coalition S = ∅, then the intersection of all winning coalitions is S, which is nonempty; this violates the nonweakness of ω. So there are at least two (distinct) minimal winning coalitions S 1 and S 2 in ω. Let S = S 1 ∩ S 2 . S is losing since it is a proper subcoalition of the minimal winning coalition S 1 . Then, since ω is strong, S c is winning. Since S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ S c = S ∩ S c = ∅, we have ν(ω) ≤ 3 by the definition of the Nakamura number. The assumption that ∅ / ∈ ω rules out ν(ω) = 1. (ν(ω) = 2 if there are distinct minimal winning coalitions S 1 and S 2 such that S = S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅; otherwise, ν(ω) = 3.)
Remark 2 The computability condition cannot be dropped from Lemma 7 (a minimal winning coalition may not exist if a winning coalition has no finite, winning subcoalition). A nonprincipal ultrafilter is a counterexample; it has an infinite Nakamura number. (See Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Sections 2.1 and 4.3) for the definition of a nonprincipal ultrafilter and the observation that it has no finite winning coalitions and is noncomputable, monotonic, proper, strong, and nonweak.)
Lemma 8 Let ω be a monotonic proper game satisfying ∅ / ∈ ω and ω = ∅. Then ν(ω) ≥ 3.
Proof. Suppose ν(ω) = 2. Then, there are winning coalitions S, S ′ whose intersection is empty. That is S ′ ⊆ S c . By monotonicity, S c is winning, implying that ω is not proper.
Lemma 9 Let ω be a nonmonotonic strong game satisfying ∅ / ∈ ω (and ω = ∅). Then ω is nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Proof. Since nonempty ω is nonmonotonic, there exist a winning coalition S and a losing coalition S ′ such that S ∩ S ′c = ∅. This means that the Nakamura number is 2, since S ′c is winning by strongness of ω.
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 imply that type 1 games have a Nakamura number equal to 3. Lemma 9 implies that type 9 games have a Nakamura number equal to 2. Proposition 10 and Example 2 give examples of these games: 17
Proposition 10 There exist finite, type 1 (i.e., monotonic proper strong nonweak) games and infinite, computable, type 1 games.
Proof. An example of a type 1 finite game is the majority game with an odd number of (at least three) players. An example of a type 1 infinite game is given in Appendix A.
Example 2 We give a type 9 finite game. Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier and let ω|T := {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} consist of {0, 1, 2}, {0}, {1}, {2}. The other four coalitions in T are losing. Then, ω is nonmonotonic, proper, strong, and nonweak with ν(ω) = 2.
Large Nakamura numbers
Having considered all the other types of games, we now turn to types 3 and 11 (i.e., proper nonstrong nonweak games). These are the only types that may have a Nakamura number greater than 3.
First, we consider games with finite carriers. An example of a game having Nakamura number equal to k ≥ 2 can be defined on the carrier T = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}; the game ω consists of the coalitions excluding at most one player in the carrier: S ∈ ω if and only if #(T ∩ S) ≥ k − 1. We extend this example slightly:
Proposition 11 For any k ≥ 3, there exists a finite, computable, type 3 (i.e., monotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number ν(ω) = k.
Then it is straightforward to show that ω is monotonic and nonweak with ν(ω) = k. Now, suppose that k ≥ 3. To show that ω is proper, suppose S ∈ ω. Then S includes at least k − 1 of the partition elements T l , implying that S c includes at most one of them. To show that ω is nonstrong, suppose that a partition element, say T l , contains at least two players, one of whom is denoted by t. We then have the following two losing coalitions complementing each other: (i) the union of k − 2 partition elements T l ′ and {t} and (ii) the union of the other partition element and T l \ {t}.
Remark 3 Because of Lemma 8, Proposition 11 precludes k = 2. Note that the game in the proof is nonproper if and only if k = 2. If k ≤ 3, then it generally fails to be strong, though it is indeed strong if all the partition elements T l consist of singletons.
Proposition 12 For any k ≥ 2, there exists a finite, computable, type 11 (i.e., nonmonotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number ν(ω) = k.
Proof. Given k ≥ 3, let {T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T k−1 } be a partition of a finite carrier T = k−1 l=0 T l . Define S ∈ ω iff #{T l : T l ⊆ S} = k − 1. Then ω is nonmonotonic; the rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 11.
For k = 2, we give the following example: Let T = {0, 1, 2} be a carrier and define ω|T = {S ∩ T : S ∈ ω} = {{0}, {1}}. It is nonmonotonic since {0} ∈ ω but {0, 1} / ∈ ω. It is proper: S ∈ ω implies S ∩ T = {0} or {1}, which in turn implies S c ∩ T = {1, 2} or {0, 2}, neither of which is in ω|T ; hence S c / ∈ ω. It is nonstrong since {0, 1} and {2} are losing. It is nonweak with ν(ω) = 2 since the intersection of the winning coalitions {0} and {1} is empty.
Remark 4 (Strategic Foundations)
We justify (give a strategic foundation for) type 3 and type 11 simple games having Nakamura number equal to k ≥ 3 by deriving them from certain game forms. These types particularly deserve justification, since they are the only types that contain (two games with different Nakamura numbers and) games with an arbitrarily large Nakamura number.
Let g: Σ i → X be a game form on the set {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} of players, defined by g(σ) = 1 if and only if #{i : σ i = 1} ≥ k − 1, where Σ i = {0, 1} is the set of player i's strategies and X = {0, 1} is the set of outcomes. One can think of the game form as representing a voting rule in which no individual has the veto power. We claim that, depending on the notion of effectivity employed, the simple game derived from g is either (i) the type 3 game consisting of the coalitions containing at least k − 1 players (a game in the proof of Proposition 11) or (ii) the type 11 game consisting of the coalitions made up of exactly k − 1 players (a game in the proof of Proposition 12).
(i) For each coalition S ⊆ I, let Σ S := i∈S Σ i and Σ −S := i / ∈S Σ i be the collective strategy set of S and that of the complement. A coalition S is α-effective for a subset B ⊆ X if S has a strategy σ S ∈ Σ S such that for any strategy σ −S ∈ Σ −S of the complement, g(σ S , σ −S ) ∈ B. 18 Define a simple game as the set of winning coalitions, where a coalition is winning if it is α-effective for all subsets of X. One can easily check that the winning coalitions for our g are the coalitions containing at least k − 1 players.
(ii) A coalition S is exactly effective for a subset B ⊆ X if B = {g(σ S , σ −S ) : σ −S ∈ Σ −S } for some σ S ∈ Σ S . 19 Define a simple game as the set of winning 18 The notion of α-effectivity is standard (e.g., Peleg, 2002) . 19 This notion of effectivity is proposed by Kolpin (1990) . It is more informative than α-effectivity. Indeed, S is α-effective for B if and only if there exists some B ′ ⊆ B such that S is exactly effective for B ′ . If a coalition S is exactly effective (not just α-effective) for a set B of at least two elements, then the complement S c can realize every (not just some) element in B by a suitable choice of strategies. Intuitively, then, S has the power to leave the others to choose from B. This notion is potentially more suitable for studying certain aspects of the theory of rights than α-effectivity is, since it describes a coalition's right to stay passive more finely. (Deb (2004, Definition 11) is an example of an application to the coalitions, where a coalition is winning if it is exactly effective for all subsets of X. Then, the winning coalitions for our g are the coalitions made up of exactly k − 1 players, which confirms our claim. In particular, the grand coalition {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}-while it is exactly effective for {0} and {1}-is not exactly effective for {0, 1}, but a coalition made up of exactly k − 1 players is.
Next, we move on to games without finite carriers. We construct them using the notion of the product of games. By a recursive function f on a recursive set T ⊆ N we mean a recursive function restricted to T .
Let (f 1 , f 2 ) be a pair consisting of a one-to-one recursive function f 1 on a (not necessarily finite) recursive set T ⊆ N and a one-to-one recursive function f 2 , whose images partition the set of players:
are recursive functions on recursive sets f 1 (T ) and f 2 (N ), respectively. 20 We define the disjoint image of coalitions S 1 ⊆ T and S 2 ⊆ N with respect to (f 1 , f 2 ) as the set
where
Example 3 When T = N , an easy example is given by f 1 : i → 2i and f 2 : i → 2i + 1. In this case, f 1 (T ) = 2N := {2i : i ∈ N }, f 2 (N ) = 2N + 1 := {2i + 1 : i ∈ N }, and {0, 2, 3} * {1, 2, 4} = {0, 4, 6, 3, 5, 9}. When T = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for some k ≥ 1, an easy example is given by f 1 : i → i and f 2 : i → i + k. In this case, if k = 4, we have f 1 (T ) = T , f 2 (N ) = N \ T = {4, 5, 6, . . .}, and {0, 2, 3} * {1, 2, 4} = {0, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8}.
Lemma 13 Let REC be the class of (recursive) coalitions. Then, {S 1 * S 2 : S 1 ⊆ T and S 2 are coalitions} = REC.
Proof. (⊆)
. By an argument similar to that in footnote 20, f 1 (S 1 ) and f 2 (S 2 ) are recursive. It follows that f 1 (S 1 ) ∪ f 2 (S 2 ) is recursive. theory of rights.) To show that α-effectivity is inadequate, take, for example, "maximal freedom" and the "right to be completely passive" by van Hees (1999) . Van Hees resolves the liberal paradox by adopting either of these notions. A necessary condition for maximal freedom is monotonicity with respect to alternatives: if a coalition is effective for a set, it should be effective for a larger set. A coalition is said to have the right to be completely passive if it is effective for the set X of all alternatives. Since α-effectivity is monotonic with respect to alternatives and since every coalition is α-effective for X, α-effectivity fails to capture the subtle, but important differences that these notions can discriminate.
20 In general, if f is a recursive function and S is a recursive set, then the image f (S) is recursively enumerable. So f1(T ) and f2(N ) are recursively enumerable. Since they complement each other on the set N , they are in fact both recursive.
(⊇). Let S be recursive. Then
Let ω 1 be a game with a carrier included in a set T . (This is without loss of generality since the grand coalition N is a carrier for any game.) Let ω 2 be a game. We define the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 of ω 1 and ω 2 with respect to (f 1 , f 2 ) by the set
of the disjoint images of winning coalitions. 21 By Lemma 13, ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is a simple game. We have S 1 * S 2 ∈ ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 if and only if S 1 ∈ ω 1 and S 2 ∈ ω 2 .
Lemma 14
If ω 1 and ω 2 are computable, then the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is computable.
Proof. Let e be a characteristic index for a coalition S := S 1 * S 2 = f 1 (S 1 ) ∪ f 2 (S 2 ). It suffices to show that given e, we can effectively obtain a characteristic index for S 1 (and similarly for S 2 ).
Let t be a characteristic index for f 1 (T ), a fixed recursive set. Effectively obtain (Soare, 1987, Corollary II.2.3 ) from e and t a characteristic index e ′ for f 1 (S 1 ) = [f 1 (S 1 ) ∪ f 2 (S 2 )] ∩ f 1 (T ). Let t ′ be an index for the recursive function
We claim that ϕ e ′ • ϕ t ′ is the characteristic function for the recursive set S 1 . (Details. Suppose i ∈ S 1 first. Then i ∈ T and f 1 (i) ∈ f 1 (S 1 ). Hence
.) By the Parameter Theorem (Soare, 1987, I.3.5) , there is a recursive function g such that ϕ g(e ′ ) (i) = ϕ e ′ • ϕ t ′ (i), implying that g(e ′ ) is characteristic index for S 1 that can be obtained effectively.
It turns out that the construction based on the product is very useful for our purpose.
Lemma 15 ω 1 and ω 2 are monotonic if and only if the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is monotonic.
Proof. By Lemma 13, any coalitionŜ can be written asŜ =Ŝ 1 * Ŝ 2 for someŜ 1 ⊆ T andŜ 2 .
(=⇒). Suppose S 1 * S 2 ∈ ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 and S 1 * S 2 ⊆ S ′ 1 * S ′ 2 . Then, we have S 1 ∈ ω 1 , S 2 ∈ ω 2 , and
Since S 1 ∈ ω 1 and S 2 ∈ ω 2 , monotonicity implies that S ′ 1 ∈ ω 1 and S ′ 2 ∈ ω 2 . That is, S ′ 1 * S ′ 2 ∈ ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 . (⇐=). We suppose that ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is monotonic and show that ω 1 is monotonic. Suppose S 1 ∈ ω 1 and S 1 ⊂ S ′ 1 . Choose any S 2 ∈ ω 2 . Then
Lemma 16 If ω 1 or ω 2 is proper, then the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is proper.
Proof. First, we can show that (S 1 * S 2 ) c = S c 1 * S c 2 , where S c 1 = T \S 1 and
Lemma 17 Suppose ω 1 is nonstrong or ω 2 is nonstrong or both ω 1 and ω 2 have losing coalitions. Then the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is nonstrong.
Proof. We give a proof for the case where each game has a losing coalition: S 1 / ∈ ω 1 and S c 2 / ∈ ω 2 . Then, S 1 * S 2 / ∈ ω 1 ⊗ω 2 and (
Lemma 18 If ω 1 and ω 2 are nonweak, then the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 is nonweak. Its Nakamura number is ν(ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 ) = max{ν(ω 1 ), ν(ω 2 )}.
The proof for the Nakamura number is similar.
Propositions 11 and 12 have analogues for infinite games (because of Lemma 8 again, Proposition 19 precludes k = 2):
Proposition 19 For any k ≥ 3, there exists an infinite, computable, type 3 (i.e., monotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number ν(ω) = k.
Proof. For k ≥ 3, let ω 1 be a finite, computable, type 3 game with ν(ω 1 ) = k. (Such a game exists by Proposition 11.) Let ω 2 be an infinite, computable, monotonic nonweak game (which need not be proper or strong or nonstrong) with ν(ω 2 ) ≤ 3. (Such a game exists by Proposition 10.) Lemmas 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 imply that the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 satisfies the conditions.
Proposition 20 For any k ≥ 2, there exists an infinite, computable, type 11 (i.e., nonmonotonic proper nonstrong nonweak) game ω with Nakamura number ν(ω) = k.
Proof. For k ≥ 2, let ω 1 be a finite, computable, type 11 game with ν(ω 1 ) = k. (Such a game exists by Proposition 12.) Let ω 2 be an infinite, computable, nonproper game. (Types 5, 7, 13, and 15 in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) are examples. Alternatively, just for obtaining the results for k ≥ 3, we can let ω 2 be an infinite, computable, nonweak game with ν(ω 2 ) = 3, which exists by Proposition 10.) Then the game is nonweak, with ν(ω 2 ) = 2 (if ∅ / ∈ ω 2 ; Lemma 6) or ν(ω 2 ) = 1 (otherwise). Lemmas 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 imply that the product ω 1 ⊗ ω 2 satisfies the conditions.
A An Infinite, Computable, Type 1 Game
We exhibit here an infinite, computable, type 1 (i.e., monotonic proper strong nonweak) simple game, thus giving a proof to Proposition 10. Though Kumabe and Mihara (2007) give an example, the readers not comfortable with recursion theory may find it too complicated. In view of the fact that such a game is used in an important result (e.g., Proposition 19) in this paper, it makes sense to give a simpler construction here. 22
Our approach is to construct recursively enumerable (in fact, recursive) sets T 0 and T 1 of strings (of 0's and 1's) satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3. We first construct certain sets F s of strings for s ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We then specify each of T 0 and T 1 using the sets F s , and construct a simple game ω according to Proposition 3. We conclude that the game is computable by checking (Lemmas 22 and 25) that T 0 and T 1 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3. Finally, we show (Claims 27, 28, and 29) that the game satisfies the desired properties.
22 One reason that the construction in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) is complicated is that they construct a family of type 1 games ω[A], one for each recursive set A, while requiring additional conditions that would later become useful for constructing other types of games. In this appendix, we construct just one type 1 game, forgetting about the additional conditions. Some aspects of the construction thus become more transparent in this construction. The construction extends the one (not requiring the game to be of a particular type) in Kumabe and Mihara (2008, Section 6 .2).
Notation. Let α and β be strings (of 0's and 1's). Then α c denotes the string of the length |α| such that α c (i) = 1 − α(i) for each i < |α|; for example, 0110100100 c = 1001011011. Occasionally, a string α is identified with the set {i : α(i) = 1}. (Note however that α c is occasionally identified with the set {i : α(i) = 0}, but never with the set {i : α(i) = 1} c .)
αβ (or α * β) denotes the concatenation of α followed by β. α ⊆ β means that α is an initial segment of β (β extends α); α ⊆ A means that α is an initial segment of a set A.
Strings α and β are incompatible if neither α ⊆ β nor β ⊆ α (i.e., there is k < min{|α|, |β|} such that α(k) = β(k)).
Let {k s } ∞ s=0 be an effective listing (recursive enumeration) of the members of the recursively enumerable set {k : ϕ k (k) ∈ {0, 1}}, where ϕ k (·) is the kth partial recursive function of one variable (it is computed by the Turing program with code (Gödel) number k). We can assume that k 0 ≥ 2 and all the elements k s are distinct. Thus,
where CRec is the set of characteristic indices for recursive sets.
Let l 0 = k 0 + 1, and for s > 0, let l s = max{l s−1 , k s + 1}. We have l s ≥ l s−1 (that is, {l s } is an nondecreasing sequence of numbers) and l s > k s for each s. Note also that
For each s, let F s be the finite set of strings α = α(0)α(1) · · · α(l s − 1) of length l s ≥ 3 such that
Note that (1) imposes no constraints on α(k) for k / ∈ {k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k s }, while it actually imposes constraints for all k in the set, since |α| = l s > k s ,
Lemma 21 Any two distinct elements α and β in F are incompatible. That is, we have neither α ⊆ β (α is an initial segment of β) nor β ⊆ α (i.e., there is k < min{|α|, |β|} such that α(k) = β(k)).
Proof. Let |α| ≤ |β|, without loss of generality. If α and β have the same length, then the conclusion follows since otherwise they become identical strings. If l s = |α| < |β| = l s ′ , then s < s ′ and by (1), α(k s ) = ϕ ks (k s ) on the one hand, but β(k s ) = 1 − ϕ ks (k s ) on the other hand. So α(k s ) = β(k s ).
The game ω will be constructed from the sets T 0 and T 1 of strings defined as follows (10 = 1 * 0, 00 = 0 * 0, and 11 = 1 * 1 below):
We observe that the sets T 0 0 , T 0 1 , T 0 , T 1 consist of strings whose lengths are at least 2, T 0 0 ⊂ T 0 , T 0 1 ⊂ T 1 , T 0 ∩ T 1 = ∅, and α ∈ T 0 ⇔ α c ∈ T 1 . Define ω by S ∈ ω if and only if S has an initial segment in T 1 . Lemmas 22 and 25 establish computability of ω (as well as the assertion that T 0 consists of losing determining strings and T 1 consists of winning determining strings) by way of Proposition 3.
Lemma 22 T 0 and T 1 are recursive.
Proof. We give an algorithm that can decide for each given string σ with a length of at least 2 whether it is in T 0 or in T 1 or neither.
. . , compute l 0 , l 1 , l 2 , . . . , and determine F 0 , F 1 , F 2 , . . . until we find the least s such that l s ≥ |σ|.
If l s > |σ|, then σ / ∈ F s . Since l s is nondecreasing in s and F s consists of strings of length l s , it follows that σ / ∈ F , implying σ /
If l s = |σ|, then check whether σ ∈ F s ; this can be done since the values of ϕ k s ′ (k s ′ ) for s ′ ≤ s in (1) are available and F s determined by time s. If σ / ∈ F s and l s+1 > l s , then σ / ∈ T 0 ∪ T 1 as before. Otherwise check whether σ ∈ F s+1 . If σ / ∈ F s+1 and l s+2 > l s+1 = l s , then σ / ∈ T 0 ∪ T 1 as before. Repeating this process, we either get σ ∈ F s ′ for some s ′ or σ / ∈ F s ′ for all s ′ ∈ {s ′ : l s ′ = l s }. In the latter case, we have σ / ∈ T 0 ∪ T 1 . In the former case, if σ(
, and we have σ ∈ T 0 0 ⊂ T 0 . Suppose σ ⊇ 01. Then σ c ⊇ 10. In this case the algorithm can decide whether σ c is in
Lemma 23 Let α, β be distinct strings in T 0 ∪T 1 . Then α and β are incompatible. In particular, if α ∈ T 0 and β ∈ T 1 , then α and β are incompatible.
Proof. Suppose α and β are compatible. Then there is a coalition S extending α and β. If α ⊇ 00, then β ⊇ 00. But there is only one string in T 0 ∪ T 1 that extends 00; namely, 00. So α = β = 00, contrary to the assumption that they are distinct. The case where α ⊇ 11 is similar. If α ⊇ 10, then β ⊇ 10. So we have α, β ∈ T 0 0 ∪ T 0 1 , which implies that α, β ∈ F . By Lemma 21, S cannot extend both α and β, a contradiction. If α ⊇ 01, then β ⊇ 01. So we have α c , β c ∈ T 0 1 ∪ T 0 1 , which implies that α c , β c ∈ F . By Lemma 21, S c cannot extend both α c and β c , a contradiction.
Lemma 24 Let α ⊇ 10 be a string of length l s such that α(k s ) = ϕ ks (k s ). Then for some t ≤ s, there is a string β ∈ F t such that 10 ⊆ β ⊆ α.
Proof.
We proceed by induction on s. If s = 0, we have β = α ∈ F 0 (note that (1) imposes no constraints on α(0) and α(1)); hence the lemma holds for s = 0. Suppose the lemma holds for s ′ < s. If for some s ′ < s, α(k s ′ ) = ϕ k s ′ (k s ′ ), then by the induction hypothesis, for some t ≤ s ′ , the l s ′ -initial segment α[l s ′ ] of α extends a string β ∈ F t . Hence the conclusion holds for s. Otherwise, we have for each
Then by (1), α ∈ F s . Letting β = α gives the conclusion.
Lemma 25 Any coalition S ∈ REC has an initial segment in T 0 or in T 1 , but not both.
Proof. We show that S has an initial segment in T 0 ∪ T 1 . Lemma 23 implies that S does not have initial segments in both T 0 and T 1 . (The assertion following "In particular" in Lemma 23 is sufficient for this, but we can actually show the stronger statement that S has exactly one initial segment in T 0 ∪ T 1 .)
The conclusion is obvious if S ⊇ 00 or S ⊇ 11. If S ⊇ 10, suppose ϕ k is the characteristic function for S. Then k ∈ {k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , . . .} since this set contains the set CRec of characteristic indices. So k = k s for some s. Consider the initial segment S[l s ] := S ∩ l s = ϕ ks [l s ] ⊇ 10. By Lemma 24, for some t ≤ s, there is a string β ∈ F t such that 10 ⊆ β ⊆ S[l s ]. The conclusion follows since β is an initial segment of S and β ∈ T 0 0 ∪ T 0 1 ⊂ T 0 ∪ T 1 . If S ⊇ 01, then S c ⊇ 10 has an initial segment β ∈ T 0 0 ∪ T 0 1 by the argument above. So, S has the initial segment β c ∈ T 1 ∪ T 0 .
Next, we show that the game ω has the desired properties. Before showing monotonicity, we need the following lemma. For strings α and β with |α| ≤ |β|, we say β properly contains α if for each k < |α|, α(k) ≤ β(k) and for some k ′ < |α|, α(k ′ ) < β(k ′ ); we say β is properly contained by α if for each k < |α|, β(k) ≤ α(k) and for some k ′ < |α|, β(k ′ ) < α(k ′ ).
Lemma 26 Let α and β be strings such that |α| ≤ |β|. (i) If α ∈ T 1 and β properly contains α, then β extends a string in T 1 . (ii) If α ∈ T 0 and β is properly contained by α, then β extends a string in T 0 .
Proof. (i) Suppose α ∈ T 1 and β properly contains α. We have α = 11 or α ∈ T 0 1 or α c ∈ T 0 0 . If α = 11, no β properly contains α. Suppose α ∈ T 0 1 . Then α ∈ F s for some s. Since β properly contains α ⊇ 10, we have β ⊇ 11 or β ⊇ 10. If β ⊇ 11, the conclusion follows since 11 ∈ T 1 . Otherwise, β ⊇ 10; choose the least
. Suppose (a) for some t < s ′ . Since α ∈ F s , we have for each t < s, α(k t ) = 1 − ϕ kt (k t ) by (1). Then we have β(k t ) = 0 and α(k t ) = 1, contradicting the assumption that β properly contains α.) The conclusion follows since the initial segment β[l s ′ ] is in T 0 1 . Suppose α c ∈ T 0 0 . Then α c ∈ F s for some s. Since β c is properly contained in α c ⊇ 10, we have β c ⊇ 00 or β c ⊇ 10. If β c ⊇ 00, the conclusion follows since β ⊇ 11 ∈ T 1 . Otherwise, β c ⊇ 10; Choose the least
(ii) Suppose α ∈ T 0 and β is properly contained by α. Then α c ∈ T 1 and β c properly contains α c . Assertion (i) then implies that β c extends a string
Claim 27 The game ω is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ ω and B ⊇ A. By the definition of ω, A has an initial segment α in T 1 . If B extends α, then clearly B ∈ ω. Otherwise the |α|-initial segment β = B[|α|] of B properly contains α. By Lemma 26, β extends a string in T 1 . Hence B has an initial segment in T 1 , implying that B ∈ ω.
Claim 28 The game ω is proper and strong.
Proof. It suffices to show that S c ∈ ω ⇔ S / ∈ ω. From the observations that T 0 and T 1 consist of determining strings and that α c ∈ T 0 ⇔ α ∈ T 1 , we have S c ∈ ω ⇐⇒ S c has an initial segment in T 1 ⇐⇒ S has an initial segment in T 0 ⇐⇒ S / ∈ ω.
Claim 29
The game ω is nonweak and does not have a finite carrier.
Proof. To show that the game does not have a finite carrier, we will construct a set A such that for infinitely many l, the l-initial segment A [l] has an extension (as a string) that is winning and for infinitely many l ′ , A[l ′ ] has an extension that is losing. This implies that A[l] is not a carrier of ω for any such l. So no subset of A[l] is a carrier. Since there are arbitrarily large such l, this proves that ω has no finite carrier.
Let A ⊇ 10 be a set such that for each k t , A(k t ) = 1 − ϕ kt (k t ). For any s ′ > 0 and i ∈ {0, 1}, there is an s > s ′ such that k s > l s ′ and ϕ ks (k s ) = i.
For a temporarily chosen s ′ , fix i and fix such s. Then choose the greatest s ′ satisfying these conditions. Since l s > k s > l s ′ , there is a string α of length l s extending A[l s ′ ] such that α ∈ F s . Since α ⊇ 10 and α(k s ) = ϕ ks (k s ) = i, we have α ∈ T 0 i . There are infinitely many such s, so there are infinitely many such s ′ . It follows that for infinitely many l s ′ , the initial segment A[l s ′ ] is a substring of some string α in T 1 , and for infinitely many l s ′ , A[l s ′ ] is a substring of some (losing) string α in T 0 .
To show nonweakness, we give three (winning) coalitions in T 1 whose intersection is empty. First, 10 (in fact any initial segment of the coalition A ⊇ 10) has extensions α in T 1 and β in T 0 by the argument above. So 01 has the extension β c in T 1 . Clearly, the intersection of the winning coalitions 11 ∈ T 1 , α ⊇ 10, and β c ⊇ 01 is empty.
B Type 9 and Type 13 Games
In this attachment, we modify the examples of a type 9 game and a type 13 game in Kumabe and Mihara (2007) so that an empty coalition is losing. To do that, modify the infinite, computable, type 1 game ω [A] in that paper as follows ((2.i) and (3) refer to certain requirements in that paper):
9. An infinite, computable, type 9 (nonmonotonic proper strong nonweak) game. In the construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) by (2*.i) for each p-string α ′ = 10 that is a proper substring of α, if s = 0 or |α ′ | ≥ l s−1 , then enumerate α ′ * 11 in T 1 and α ′ * 00 in T 0 ; furthermore, enumerate 1011 and 1000 in T 0 .
By ( 1 , 1000 ∈ T ′ 0 , 0100 ∈ T ′ 0 , and 0111 ∈ T ′ 1 .) Letting α ′ = ∅ in (2*.i), we have 00 ∈ T 0 ; so ∅ is losing. Since either α ′ = 1010 or 1001 is a p-string satisfying the condition in (2*.i), either 101011 ∈ T 1 or 100111 ∈ T 1 . Then by (3), either 010100 ∈ T 0 or 011000 ∈ T 0 . So the game is nonmonotonic, since 0100 is winning. It is also nonweak since 0100 is winning and either 101011 or 100111 is winning. For the remaining properties, the proofs are similar to the proofs for ω[A].
13. An infinite, computable, type 13 (nonmonotonic nonproper strong nonweak) game. In the construction of ω[A], replace (2.i) and (3) by (2*.i) for each p-string α ′ = 10 that is a proper substring of α, if s = 0 or |α ′ | ≥ l s−1 , then enumerate α ′ * 11 in T 1 and α ′ * 00 in T 0 ; furthermore, enumerate 1011 and 0100 in T 1 and 1000 in T 0 ; (3*) if a string β / ∈ {1011, 0100} is enumerated in T 1 (or in T 0 ) above, then enumerate β c in T 0 (or in T 1 , respectively). By an argument similar to that for type 9, ∅ is losing and the game is nonmonotonic (either 010100 ∈ T 0 or 011000 ∈ T 0 , while 0100 is winning). It is nonproper since the 0100 and 1011 are winning determining. It is strong since its subset ω[A] is strong. It is nonweak by Lemma 1 since it is nonproper. The proofs of computability and nonexistence of a finite carrier are similar to the proofs for ω [A] .
